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The transmissibility of the strain of inﬂuenza virus which caused the 1968 inﬂuenza pandemic is poorly un-
derstood. Increases in outbreak size between the ﬁrst and second waves suggest that it may even have increased
between successive waves. The authors estimated basic and effective reproduction numbers for both waves of the
1968 inﬂuenza pandemic. Epidemic curves and overall attack rates for the 1968 pandemic, based on clinical and
serologic data, were retrieved from published literature. The basic and effective reproduction numbers were
estimated from 46 and 17 data sets for the ﬁrst and second waves, respectively, based on the growth rate and/
or ﬁnal size of the epidemic. Estimates of the basic reproduction number (R0) were in the range of 1.06–2.06 for the
ﬁrst wave and, assuming cross-protection, 1.21–3.58 in the second. Within each wave, there was little geographic
variation in transmissibility. In the 10 settings for which data were available for both waves, R0 was estimated to be
higher during the second wave than during the ﬁrst. This might partly explain the larger outbreaks in the second
wave as compared with the ﬁrst. This potential for change in viral behavior may have consequences for future
pandemic mitigation strategies.
basic reproduction number; disease outbreaks; inﬂuenza, human; models, theoretical; Orthomyxoviridae
The current pandemic of novel H1N1 inﬂuenza illustrates
the ability of novel inﬂuenza viruses to spread rapidly
through populations. H1N1 ﬁrst emerged in spring 2009,
and a second wave is expected in the Northern Hemisphere
in the autumn. The 1968 (Hong Kong) H3N2 inﬂuenza pan-
demic also occurred in 2 waves, the second being more
severe than the ﬁrst in many settings (1–9). Like H1N1
(and H5N1, another inﬂuenza virus with pandemic poten-
tial), the H3N2 virus was not completely antigenically novel
but shared its neuraminidase with the H2N2 virus, which
had circulated for the preceding 10 years.
The impact of any pandemic depends to a great extent on
the transmissibility of the causal pathogen, which is usu-
ally described using the basic reproduction number, R0 (the
average number of secondary infectious cases resulting
from an infectious person’s introduction into a totally sus-
ceptible population). The equivalent statistic in a partially
susceptible population is the effective (net) reproduction
number, Rn. According to several studies, the R0 of the
1918 H1N1 (10–16) and 1957 H2N2 (12, 13, 17) pandemic
inﬂuenza viruses was between 1.2 and 3. The characteris-
tics of the H3N2 pandemic inﬂuenza virus are poorly un-
derstood. Estimates of its reproduction numbers have
primarily been based upon data from the second wave
(11–13, 18); in a study based on national general practice
consultation data from England and Wales, Hall et al. (19)
estimated that Rn increased slightly between successive
waves, from 1.28 to 1.56. Several estimates have been
based upon mortality data (11, 13, 18), and all but 2
(20, 21) were based on national (11, 13, 18, 19) or city-
level (12, 18) data from England and Wales. Few studies
have explored temporal or geographic variation in the R0 of
the 1968 pandemic virus.
In this study, we reviewed morbidity and serologic data
from diverse settings for the ﬁrst and second waves of the
1968 inﬂuenza pandemic to determine the extent to which
R0 and Rn differed temporally, geographically, and between
successive waves.
465 Am J Epidemiol 2010;171:465–478Table 1. Data Sets From Open Settings Used in Analyses of the H3N2 Inﬂuenza Pandemic of 1968
Setting Wave Observation
Period
a
Case Deﬁnition/
Source of Data
% of Population
Meeting Case
Deﬁnition
b
No. of
Persons
Meeting
Case
Deﬁnition
Size of Eligible
Population
%o f
Population
Susceptible to
Infection at
Beginning of
Wave
Method
Used to
Estimate R0
Length of
Period Used
to Estimate
Growth Rate,
weeks
Hong Kong (36) 1 May 27, 1968–
September 28,
1968
Cases of ILI reported
weekly to the
Epidemiological Ofﬁce
from 6 outpatient
departments and
hospitals
N/A 100
c Growth rate 4
Bangkok/
Dhonburi,
Thailand (37)
1 July 29, 1968–
December 1,
1968
Attendance at an
outpatient clinic of
Siriraj Hospital with
clinical diagnosis of
inﬂuenza
N/A 100
c Growth rate 6
July 29, 1968–
November 17,
1968
Physician’s diagnosis of
inﬂuenza reported in
a questionnaire survey
of school students and
their families and
medical students
N/A 100
c Growth rate 9
Panama Canal
Zone (22)
1 August 5, 1968–
November 10,
1968
Clinic visits for acute
respiratory infection in
Paraı ´so and Pedro
Miguel, Panama, for
patients aged  3 years
N/A 94
d Growth rate 4
November 1968  4-fold increase in HI
antibody titer since
June/July 1968 in
serologic survey of
laboratory workers
26 15 57 93
e Final size
September 1,
1968–October
31, 1968
Clinical ILI reported in
a retrospective survey
of families in Paraiso
and Pedro Miguel
46 235 516 94
d Final size
Kansas City,
Missouri, United
States (23)
1 November 4,
1968–January
18, 1969
Self-reported ILI (deﬁned
as ‘‘an illness with the
symptoms of fever,
cough, muscle aches
and pains, headache,
and sore throat’’) in
a retrospective
questionnaire survey of
high school students
and their families
39 2,711 6,994 100
c Growth rate, ﬁnal
size
7
November 4,
1968–January
18, 1969
HI antibody titer  1:10 in
a serologic survey of
a subgroup of students
49 139 285 100
c Final size
November 4,
1968–January
18, 1969
HI antibody titer  1:10
and self-reported ILI
(deﬁned as above) in
the same subgroup of
students
28 81 285 100
c Growth rate 5
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8Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania,
United States
(35)
1 October 29,
1968–
December 22,
1968
Weekly laboratory-
conﬁrmed Hong Kong
inﬂuenza isolates
N/A 100
c Growth rate 4
United Kingdom (2) 1 December 23,
1968–June 22,
1969
Inﬂuenza and ILI reported
to the General Practice
Research Unit of the
RCGP, for patients
consulting 40 general
practices
N/A 90 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 8
Summer 1969 HI antibody titer  1:10 in
serologic survey of
serum samples from
adults sent to the PHLS
for other tests
57 631 1,104 58
d Final size
November 4,
1968–April 6,
1969
Weekly laboratory-
conﬁrmed inﬂuenza
cases (inﬂuenza A virus
isolations and cases
with  4-fold increase in
antibody titer) reported
to the PHLS by hospital
and public health
laboratories
N/A 90 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 6
United Kingdom (7) 1 December 9,
1968–April 20,
1969
Clinical inﬂuenza cases
reported by the RCGP
N/A 90 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 9
United Kingdom (2) 2 November 3,
1969–April 5,
1970
Inﬂuenza and ILI reported
to the General Practice
Research Unit of the
RCGP, for patients
consulting 40 general
practices
N/A 65 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 8
Summer 1970 HI antibody titer  1:10 in
serologic survey of
serum samples from
adults sent to the PHLS
for other tests
70 1,502 2,139 43
d Final size
November 10,
1969–February
22, 1970
Weekly laboratory-
conﬁrmed inﬂuenza
cases (inﬂuenza A virus
isolations and cases
with  4-fold increase in
antibody titer) reported
to the PHLS by hospital
and public health
laboratories
N/A 65 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 5
United Kingdom (7) 2 December 8,
1969–April 5,
1970
Reports to the PHLS of
inﬂuenza A virus
isolations and cases
with a  4-fold increase
in antibody titer from
public health and
hospital laboratories
N/A 65 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 6
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Setting Wave Observation
Period
a
Case Deﬁnition/
Source of Data
% of Population
Meeting Case
Deﬁnition
b
No. of
Persons
Meeting
Case
Deﬁnition
Size of Eligible
Population
%o f
Population
Susceptible to
Infection at
Beginning of
Wave
Method
Used to
Estimate R0
Length of
Period Used
to Estimate
Growth Rate,
weeks
Scotland (8) 1 December 30,
1968–June 15,
1969
Returns from laboratories
of viral isolations,  4-
fold increase in
antibody titer, or high
single antibody titer
N/A 90 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 7
2 December 1,
1969–April 26,
1970
Returns from laboratories
of viral isolations,  4-
fold increase in
antibody titer, or high
single antibody titer
65 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 8
Cirencester, United
Kingdom (38)
1 November 27,
1968–April 15,
1969
Weekly GP consultations
for febrile respiratory
disease
N/A 90 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 10
Shefﬁeld, United
Kingdom (24)
1 May–July 1969 HI antibody titer  1:6 in
serologic survey of
blood donors, antenatal
clinic attendees, and
samples submitted for
other tests
35 160 454 90
d Final size
Lambeth, London,
United Kingdom
(2)
1 Summer 1969  4-fold increase in HI
antibody titer in
serologic survey of men
living in the London
borough of Lambeth
31 112 367 81
d Final size
2 Summer 1970  4-fold increase in HI
antibody titer in
serologic survey of men
living in the London
borough of Lambeth
28 85 302 52
d Final size
West Nile District,
Uganda (25)
1 November 1969 HI antibody titer  1:20 in
serologic survey of
samples collected
during an unrelated
survey
17 19 115 100
c Final size
Kabale,
Uganda (25)
1 January 1970 HI antibody titer  1:20 in
serologic survey of
randomly selected
outpatients and staff at
Kabale Hospital
22 16 73 100
c Final size
Czechoslovakia
(39)
1 January 6, 1969–
June 1, 1969
Weekly reported clinical
inﬂuenza cases in
Czechoslovakia, Czech
Socialist Republic, and
5 districts individually
N/A 100
c Growth rate 4–8,
depending
on district
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Soviet Socialist
Republics (32)
1 January–
February 1969
‘‘Morbidity’’ in adult
placebo group in trial of
prophylactic interferon
18 551 3,129 100
c Final size
‘‘Morbidity’’ in older
children’s (ages 7–12
years) placebo group in
trial of prophylactic
interferon
20 413 2,055 100
c Final size
Donetsk, Ukraine
(32)
1 Not stated ‘‘Morbidity’’ in young
children’s (ages 2–6
years) placebo group in
trial of prophylactic
interferon
12 53 454 100
c Final size
Sa ˜o Paulo, Brazil
(4)
1 February 1969 HI antibody titer  1:10 in
serologic survey
70 684 980 73
d Final size
2 1970 HI antibody titer  1:10 in
serologic survey
74 588 790 30
d Final size
Khartoum, Sudan
(9, 27)
2 After May 1970 Complement-ﬁxing
antibody titer  1:10 in
serologic survey of
outpatients and serum
samples submitted for
other tests in Khartoum,
Omdurman, and
Khartoum North
64 123 192 50
c Final size
November 3,
1969–May 30,
1970
Cases of ILI reported
weekly to outpatient
departments in
hospitals and health
centers in Khartoum
N/A 50
c Growth rate 5
Sydney, New South
Wales, Australia
(5)
1 May 1970 ‘‘Demonstrable
antibodies’’ in serologic
survey of blood donors
40 213 538 94
d Final size
2 September 1970  4-fold increase in HI
antibody titer since May
1970 in serologic
survey of blood donors
21 159 760 60
d Final size
Epping, New South
Wales, Australia
(6)
1 Approximately
July–August
1969
Cases of ILI reported
during retrospective
surveys of GP patients
and their families who
consulted a GP for any
reason after the
epidemic (excluding
vaccinees)
16 176 1,099 94 (based on
ref. 5)
Final size
2 Approximately
June–August
1970
Cases of ILI reported
during retrospective
surveys of GP patients
and their families who
consulted a GP for any
reason after the
epidemic (excluding
vaccinees)
24 305 1,275 60 (based on
ref. 5)
Final size
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8Table 1. Continued
Setting Wave Observation
Period
a
Case Deﬁnition/
Source of Data
% of Population
Meeting Case
Deﬁnition
b
No. of
Persons
Meeting
Case
Deﬁnition
Size of Eligible
Population
%o f
Population
Susceptible to
Infection at
Beginning of
Wave
Method
Used to
Estimate R0
Length of
Period Used
to Estimate
Growth Rate,
weeks
Epping, New South
Wales, Australia
(33)
1 Approximately
July–August
1969
Cases of ILI reported
during retrospective
surveys of GP patients
and their families who
consulted a GP for any
reason after the
epidemic (excluding
vaccinees)
19 150 808 94 (based on
ref. 5)
Final size
New South Wales,
Australia (6)
1 June 21, 1969–
September 12,
1969
Weekly Hong Kong
inﬂuenza virus isolates
at Institute of Clinical
Pathology and Medical
Research
N/A 94 (based on
ref. 5)
Growth rate 4
Guatemala (40) 2 August 10, 1969–
December 27,
1969
Weekly reported cases of
ILI
N/A 50
c Growth rate 7
Doncaster, United
Kingdom (1)
2 November 26,
1969–January
20, 1970
Weekly GP consultations
for clinical inﬂuenza
N/A 65 (based on
ref. 24)
Growth rate 4
November 26,
1969–January
20, 1970
‘‘Probable inﬂuenza’’ as
judged by response to
questionnaire survey of
random sample of
patients registered with
a general practice
20 108 530 65 (based on
ref. 24)
Final size
Mombasa, Kenya
(26)
2 February 1970 HI antibody titer  1:20
f in
serologic survey of
randomly selected
patients receiving
treatment at a hospital
37 21 57 100
c,g Final size
Arusha, Tanzania
(26)
2 February 1970 HI antibody titer  1:20
f in
serologic survey of
randomly selected
patients receiving
treatment at a hospital
72 65 90 100
c Final size
Abbreviations: GP, general practitioner; HI, hemagglutination-inhibiting; ILI, inﬂuenza-like illness; N/A, not applicable; PHLS, Public Health Laboratory Service; RCGP, Royal College of General Practitioners.
a Period covered by incidence data or time at which serum samples were taken.
b For data sets with good ascertainment only. For serologic data, the proportion of the population meeting the case deﬁnition is not necessarily equivalent to the proportion experiencing infection during the given wave
(as seropositivity may reﬂect infection either during that wave or previously). ‘‘N/A’’ means that ascertainment was incomplete. Numerators may include persons who did not report the date of onset of illness and
therefore were not included in estimation of R0 using the epidemic growth rate.
c Assumed proportion susceptible.
d Proportion susceptible based on the original data set or on data cited in the original paper.
e Data cited in the paper implied that 94% of persons in the wider population were likely to be susceptible; however, because of the small size of this sample, it was necessary to round to 93%.
f Case deﬁnition not given, but comparison with reference 25 suggests this deﬁnition.
g Although these data refer to the second wave, the data were inconsistent with 50% of individuals being susceptible at the start of the wave. Therefore, it was assumed that all persons were initially susceptible.
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8MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data sources
We searched PubMed and CAB Direct from 1966 to 2006
for English-language studies that presented data on 1) the
proportions of persons who experienced infection (as im-
plied by serologic analysis) or clinical disease and 2) weekly
numbers of cases during the ﬁrst and/or second waves of the
1968 inﬂuenza pandemic. Reference lists in the articles re-
trieved were also searched, and key journals (including Bul-
letin of the World Health Organization, British Medical
Journal, and Weekly Epidemiological Record) from 1968–
1970 were hand-searched. Age-stratiﬁed data were also ob-
tained where possible. The data sets (Tables 1 and 2) were
classiﬁed as referring to either conﬁned (e.g., military bases,
ships, homes, schools) or open (cities or national popula-
tions) settings. Data sets which clearly included vaccinated
persons were excluded. The ﬁrst and second waves were
deﬁned from the identiﬁed reports, based on the timing of
the global circulation of the virus: approximately July 1968
to August 1969 for the ﬁrst wave and September 1969 to
September 1970 for the second.
Serologic data. We identiﬁed 25 suitable serologic data sets
(17 for the ﬁrst wave, 8 for the second (2–5, 22–31)). The def-
inition of infection varied (Tables 1 and 2) but was frequently
either a hemagglutination-inhibiting antibody titer of  1:10 or
a  4-fold increase in hemagglutination-inhibiting antibody
titer. For consistency, when hemagglutination-inhibiting an-
tibody titers were presented withouta deﬁnitionofinfection,
a titer of  1:10 was taken as positive.
Clinical attack rates. We identiﬁed 11 data sets (9 for the
ﬁrst wave, 2 for the second (1, 6, 22, 23, 32–35)) with suit-
able data on the proportion of persons who experienced
clinical disease (i.e., clinical attack rates). These were data
sets in which ascertainment appeared to be good—for exam-
ple, from retrospective surveys or intervention studies. Case
deﬁnitions were taken from the original data sets. We calcu-
lated 95% exact binomial conﬁdence intervals for both the
clinical attack rates and the proportions seropositive.
Epidemic curves. We identiﬁed 27 suitable data sets
(20 for the ﬁrst wave, 7 for the second (1, 2, 6–9, 22, 23,
35–40)) on the weekly number of clinical cases (see Web
Figure 1, which is posted on the Journal’s Web site (http://
aje.oxfordjournals.org/)). Data sets involving small numbers
of cases (e.g., <25) or irregular increases in case numbers
were excluded.
Analyses of attack rates and reproduction numbers
Calculation of susceptible attack rates. For settings in
which the proportion of persons seropositive before and
after one or both waves was available, the susceptible attack
rate (ARsus) was calculated as
ARsus ¼
Ppost   Ppre
1   Ppre
;
where Ppre and Ppost are the proportions seropositive before
and after the given wave, respectively. We estimated 95%
credible intervals for the susceptible attack rate by Monte
Carlo sampling of posterior distributions of the proportion
seropositive in each wave, using conjugate properties of the
beta distribution with binomial priors (41). Here, Ppre and
Ppost were treated as though they were independent.
Estimation of R0. R0 was estimated for each data set
using either the ﬁnal size of the epidemic (for serologic data
and clinical data with good ascertainment) or its growth rate
(for epidemic curves) (42, 43) (Tables 1 and 2). These
methods do not account for contact patterns in the popula-
tion. Although recent studies have suggested that contact
patterns are age-dependent (44), the attack rates in the
age-stratiﬁed data we retrieved did not vary with age
(Web Figures 2 and 3 (http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/)). This
is paradoxical and may reﬂect age-related differences in
susceptibility or case ascertainment. Such effects are difﬁ-
cult to study using the limited age-stratiﬁed data available;
therefore, we restricted our analyses to data which were not
age-stratiﬁed.
Estimates of R0 using the ﬁnal size of the epidemic. R0
was estimated for the corresponding data sets (1–6, 22–35)
using the equation (42)
R0 ¼
N   1
C
X S0
i¼Sfþ1
1
i
; ð1Þ
where N is the population size, C is the number of infected
persons or clinical cases (depending on the data set) re-
corded during the wave, and S0 and Sf are the numbers of
persons considered to be susceptible in the population at the
beginning and end of the wave, respectively.
The standard error (SE) of R0 was calculated as (42)
SEðR0Þ¼
N   1
C
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X S0
i¼Sfþ1
1/i2 þ
CR0
2
ðN   1Þ
2
v u u t : ð2Þ
Rn was estimated as Rn ¼ R0s, where s is the proportion of
the population that is susceptible to infection at the begin-
ning of the wave. We calculated 95% conﬁdence intervals
for Rn by multiplying the respective limits on R0 by the
proportion susceptible.
Estimates of R0 using the growth rate of the
epidemic. For each epidemic curve (1, 2, 6–9, 22, 23,
35–40; Web Figure 1), Rn was estimated using the equation
(43)
Rn ¼ K
2LD þ K
 
L þ D
 
þ 1; ð3Þ
where L and D are the durations of the latent and infectious
periods, respectively, and K is the growth rate in the cumu-
lative number of cases reported during the exponential
growth phase of the epidemic (calculated as the gradient
of the straight line ﬁtted to the natural logarithm of the
cumulative number of cases during this phase). We esti-
mated the length of this phase for each data set (Tables 1
and 2) by visually inspecting the plot of the natural loga-
rithm of the cumulative number of cases against time. The
latent and infectiousperiods were each assumed to last 2 days,
Transmissibility of Hong Kong Inﬂuenza 471
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Setting Wave Observation
Period
a
Case Deﬁnition/
Source of Data
% of Population
Meeting Case
Deﬁnition
b
No. of
Persons
Meeting
Case
Deﬁnition
Size of Eligible
Population
%o f
Population
Susceptible to
Infection at
Beginning of
Wave
Method
Used to
Estimate R0
USS Finch, Hong
Kong (28)
1 August 2, 1968–
August 26, 1968
 4-fold increase in HI and/or
complement-ﬁxing antibody
titer among men providing
3 serum samples during an
outbreak aboard a US naval
vessel after arrival in Hong Kong
48 47 97 100
c Final size
Medical conference,
Teheran, Iran (34)
1 September 7, 1968–
September 15, 1968
Reported general and local
symptoms with or without
fever reported through a
questionnaire survey of
attendees following an
outbreak at a medical
conference
35 296 844 99
d Final size
Japanese Self-Defense
Forces camps (29)
1 April 1969  4-fold increase in HI antibody
titer since October 1968 in a
serologic survey of randomly
selected persons in Japanese
Self-Defense Forces camps
37 495 1,325 100
c Final size
Japanese primary
school (29)
1 November 1968 Hong Kong antibody titer  1:128
in a serologic survey of children
in an ‘‘epidemic’’ primary school
class
69 33 48 100
c Final size
Fuchu sanatorium,
Japan (29)
1 April 1969  4-fold increase in antibody titer
since February 1969 or single
titer  1:128 in a serologic survey
of patients
19 22 114 100
c Final size
Nakano sanatorium,
Japan (29)
1 May 1969  4-fold increase in antibody titer
since February 1969 or single
titer  1:128 in a serologic survey
of patients and staff
34 202 593 100
c Final size
Japanese Ground Self-
Defense Forces (30)
1 May 1969  4-fold increase in HI antibody titer
since October 1968 in a control
group living in different barracks
than the vaccinated group in a
clinical trial of Hong Kong inﬂuenza
vaccine among soldiers
63 57 90 100
c Final size
Elderly care home,
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania,
United States (35)
1 November 1968 ILI in residents during an outbreak
of Hong Kong inﬂuenza
31 255 824 100
c Final size
Children’s home,
North Carolina,
United States (31)
1 December 1968 Admission to inﬁrmary with  4-fold
increase in complement-ﬁxing or
HI antibody titer, or other serologic
evidence of infection
15
d 41 277 100
c,d Final size
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by Vynnycky et al. (15)). R0 was estimated using the equa-
tion R0 ¼ Rn/s. We calculated 95% conﬁdence intervals for
Rn (and hence R0) from the 95% conﬁdence limits on K.
Equation 3 assumes that the latent and infectious periods
follow the exponential distribution; however, in previous
analyses of several H1N1 pandemic inﬂuenza data sets, in-
vestigators found that R0’s in most cases were very similar,
irrespective of whether an exponential or tight distribution
of the latent and infectious periods was assumed (15). We
also used the expression eKTg (where Tg is the generation
time), which provides an upper bound for Rn (45), to assess
whether we had underestimated Rn.
All persons in a given setting were assumed to be suscep-
tible to infection before the ﬁrst pandemic wave, unless there
was evidence to the contrary (e.g., data on pre-epidemic
seropositivity) from the same setting or a similar setting
(Tables 1 and 2). The proportion susceptible at the start
of the second wave was also based on serologic data (see
Tables 1 and 2). For Guatemala and Khartoum, Sudan, se-
rologic data were unavailable, and 50% of persons were
assumed to be susceptible at the start of the second wave,
which is plausible given the proportion of persons who were
seropositive after the ﬁrst wave elsewhere (Web Figure 4
(http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/)).
To explore the sensitivity of our estimates of R0 and Rn to
assumptions about the proportion initially susceptible, all
analyses were repeated assuming that 100% and 50% of
each population was susceptible at the start of the ﬁrst and
second waves, respectively.
RESULTS
Proportions infected and clinical attack rates
The proportion of persons with serologic evidence of in-
fection after the ﬁrst waveof the 1968 pandemic varied from
15% in a North Carolina children’s home to 76% in Japanese
Self-Defense Forces camps (Web Figure 4). After the second
wave, this proportion ranged from 37% in Mombasa, Kenya,
to 74% in Sa ˜o Paulo, Brazil. The corresponding susceptible
attackratesvaried from19% to58% duringthe ﬁrst wave and
from 15% to 50% during the second. Neither the clinical
attack rates nor the susceptible attack rate varied markedly
with age in the settings for which age-stratiﬁed data were
available (Web Figures 2 and 3).
Clinical attack rates were generally low (typically 10%–
20%) in open settings, except for Kansas City, Missouri, and
the Panama Canal Zone, where the attack rates were 39%
and 46%, respectively (Web Figure 4). Clinical attack rates
were available for only 2 conﬁned settings; these were
higher (31% and 36%) than the clinical attack rates in most
open settings. Clinical attack rates varied little with age,
except in Doncaster, United Kingdom, where they were
highest in young to middle-aged adults (Web Figure 3).
Basic and effective reproduction numbers
R0 and Rn could be estimated from both the ﬁnal size and
the growth rate of the respective epidemics in Kansas City
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Am J Epidemiol 2010;171:465–478during the ﬁrst wave and in Khartoum and Doncaster during
the second (Tables 1 and 2). In all cases, the 2 methods
produced similar estimates. The rest of the estimates of R0
and Rn are considered irrespective of the method used.
For the ﬁrst wave, Rn was estimated as 1.06–2.01 and
1.08–1.62 in open and conﬁned settings, respectively
(Web Figure 5 (http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/)). The corre-
sponding R0 estimates, allowing for pre-epidemic immunity
as indicated by seropositivity, were 1.06–2.06 and 1.08–1.62
(Figures 1 and 2). The estimates generally appeared similar
irrespective of the time of year or location. There were no
consistent differences between the estimates of R0 in open
and conﬁned settings.
For the second wave, Rn was estimated as 1.08–2.02 in
open settings and as 1.43 (95% conﬁdence interval: 1.23,
1.63) in a single conﬁned setting. The corresponding R0
estimates for the second wave were 1.21–3.58 (open set-
tings) and 1.86 (95% conﬁdence interval: 1.60, 2.12) (con-
ﬁned setting). In all 10 settings for which R0 was estimated
for both waves, the point estimate for the second wave was
higher than that for the ﬁrst (Table 3). Differences in Rn
between waves were variable (e.g., the point estimate for
the second wave was higher than that for the ﬁrst in 7 of 10
data sets), since Rn also depends on the proportion of per-
sons who were susceptible at the beginning of the wave.
Our estimates of Rn b a s e do nt h eg r o w t hr a t ew e r e
generally only slightly smaller than the upper bound ob-
tained using the expression eKTg (see Web Table (http://
aje.oxfordjournals.org/)).
Repetition of the analyses using the alternative assump-
tions that 100% and 50% of each population were sus-
ceptible at the beginning of the ﬁrst and second waves,
respectively, produced R0 estimates of 1.06–2.01 during
the ﬁrst wave and 1.21–4.22 during the second. The corre-
sponding Rn estimates were 1.06–2.01 and 1.05–2.11 (data
not shown). Again, each second-wave R0 estimate was
higher than the corresponding ﬁrst-wave estimate, while
changes in Rn between waves were less consistent.
DISCUSSION
Our results extend knowledge of the H3N2 inﬂuenza
pandemic, ﬁrstly by including data from a much wider geo-
graphic range of settings than has been previously analyzed
and secondly by estimating transmissibility during both
pandemic waves for multiple settings. We found that R0
Figure1. Estimatedbasicreproduction numbers(R0) for the1968H3N2inﬂuenzapandemicbasedontheﬁnalsize orgrowthrateof theepidemic
inopensettings.Estimates are arrangedinorderof occurrence oftheﬁrst pandemicwave(indicatedbythedatesatthebottomof theﬁgure),unless
only second-wave data are shown. The 2 data sets for Epping, New South Wales, Australia, refer to 2 different retrospective surveys. Data from 5
other districts in Czechoslovakia (Tachov, Most, Pilsen, U ´stı ´ nad Labem, and Sokolov), described in the article by Fedova ´ et al. (39), produced
results similar to the Czech data shown here (range, 1.10–1.19). ILI, inﬂuenza-like illness; PHLS, Public Health Laboratory Service; RCGP, Royal
College of General Practitioners; USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Bars, 95% conﬁdence interval.
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Am J Epidemiol 2010;171:465–478increased between the 2 waves of the pandemic, being in the
ranges 1.06–2.06 and 1.21–3.58 during the ﬁrst and second
waves, respectively. We found little geographic or temporal
variation in R0 or Rn within each wave. In contrast with
those found for the 1918 pandemic, our estimates for open
and conﬁned settings differed little, perhaps because we de-
ﬁned ‘‘conﬁned’’ rather broadly; for example, primary
schools and care homes in 1968/1969 would have been less
crowded than the prisons and ships considered for the 1918
pandemic (15).
One of our assumptions was that infection during the ﬁrst
wave conferred immunity during the second. This was based
on the facts that 1) the proportion of persons who were
seropositive to the prototype Hong Kong virus isolated dur-
ing the ﬁrst wave increased between the 2 waves (2–5, 46);
2) hemagglutinin did not evolve signiﬁcantly between the 2
waves (47, 48); and 3) in 1 study, no person with a  4-fold
rise in hemagglutination-inhibiting antibody titer during the
ﬁrst wave showed evidence of infection during the second
(3).
Our conclusions also depended in part upon the quality of
the data assembled. Data quality was difﬁcult to assess for
some of the data sets. Many of them appeared to be of high
quality, but a few had limitations, such as small sample
sizes, unclear clinical case deﬁnitions, or low antibody titers
in serologic case deﬁnitions (Tables 1 and 2). We restricted
our estimates of R0 based on the ﬁnal epidemic size to data
sets with good ascertainment, since these estimates depend
on the completeness of case reporting (estimates based on
the growth rate are sensitive to the completeness of report-
ing only if this changes over time). Clinical data, however,
are subject to misclassiﬁcation and also will exclude asymp-
tomatic infections. This could have caused us to underesti-
mate R0 based on the ﬁnal epidemic size from clinical data,
if asymptomatically infected persons were infectious.
For a few of the studies, data on the epidemic curve
during the early stages of the wave were absent (Web Figure
1). These missing notiﬁcations were attributed to back-
ground inﬂuenza infections or inﬂuenza-like illness. The
extent to which this assumption was appropriate was dif-
ﬁcult to determine for Guatemala, since the outbreak of
inﬂuenza-like illness was preceded by an epidemic of
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (40). Missing data
late in the epidemic would not affect estimates based on
the growth rate, which use only data from the early stages.
Serologic data, while more speciﬁcthan clinical data, also
have caveats. Firstly, for 6 of the serologic data sets, infec-
tion was deﬁned using a relatively low hemagglutination-
inhibiting antibody titer ( 1:10 or lower). Secondly, pre-
epidemic seropositivity may indicate preexisting cross-
reacting antibody rather than infection with H3N2 inﬂuenza
(3, 24). Either of these factors could have caused us to over-
estimate the proportion of persons who were immune at
either the start or the end of the epidemic wave; the net
effect on our estimates of R0 is difﬁcult to predict.
For example, overestimating the proportion immune at
the end of the wave would have caused us to overestimate
the ﬁnal epidemic size and R0. Overestimating the
Figure2. Estimatedbasicreproduction numbers(R0) for the1968H3N2inﬂuenzapandemicbasedontheﬁnalsize orgrowthrateof theepidemic
in conﬁned settings. Estimates are arranged in order of occurrence of the ﬁrst pandemic wave (indicated by the dates at the bottom of the ﬁgure).
The 2 data sets for Japanese Self-Defense Forces camps refer to 2 different serologic surveys. Bars, 95% conﬁdence interval.
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mation of the epidemic size and R0. It could also have
caused us to underestimate the proportion of persons in
the population who were responsible for generating the
cases during the epidemic, leading to an overestimate in R0.
We excluded data sets involving vaccinated persons
wherever possible. However, the limited quantities of vac-
cine available during the ﬁrst wave are not believed to have
signiﬁcantly affected the outbreaks in the United Kingdom
or the United States (2, 49). No other large-scale interven-
tions or behavior changes were mentioned in the source
papers (where data referred to intervention trials, we in-
cluded only the control groups), but people may have reac-
tively reduced their social mixing, as apparently happened
during the 1918 pandemic (50). Successful interventions, if
implemented, would have reduced the epidemic size, lead-
ing us to underestimate R0 on this basis. However, they
probably would have been introduced too late to affect our
estimates based on the growth rate, which used only data
from the epidemic’s early stages.
To our knowledge, only 1 previous study has assessed the
transmissibility of H3N2 inﬂuenza during both pandemic
waves (19). Using general practice consultation data from
England and Wales, Hall et al. (19) found that Rn increased
slightly from 1.28 during the ﬁrst wave to 1.56 during the
second. This is broadly consistent with our estimates of Rn
for this setting (nationally and subnationally), which ranged
from 1.10 to 1.30 during the ﬁrst wave and from 1.19 to 2.02
during the second. While we estimated that R0 increased
between waves in all settings for which data on both waves
were available, it is unclear whether this conclusion is gen-
eralizable to other settings: It is possible that in some set-
tings, only 1 wave occurred or a second wave occurred but
was not reported.
Changes in transmissibility have been examined for suc-
cessive waves of the 1918 H1N1 pandemic. In Geneva,
Switzerland, R0 was estimated to increase from 1.49 during
the ﬁrst wave to an Rn of 3.75 during the second wave (14).
In Scandinavia, transmissibility decreased between waves
(e.g., from 2.2–3.0 for R0 during the ﬁrst wave to 1.2–1.3
for Rn during the second in Copenhagen, Denmark (16)),
which could be attributable to reductions in both the suscep-
tible populationandR0.Otherstudiesofthispandemicfound
that R0 decreased (e.g., from 2.1 to 1.8 to 1.5 in successive
waves in England and Wales (13)), showed no clear pattern
(12, 13), or remained relatively unchanged (15).
The increases in R0 between successive waves of the
H3N2 pandemic suggested here might be attributable to at
least 2 factors. First, they could be related to molecular
changes in the virus; for example, drift in the neuraminidase
between the 2 waves has been reported (47, 48) and could
perhaps be associated with increased transmissibility. Sec-
ond, they could be related to the timing of the respec-
tive outbreaks. For example, the ﬁrst wave in the United
Kingdom began just before Christmas, whereas the larger
outbreaks of the second wave in the United Kingdom and
the ﬁrst wave in the United States began earlier in the year,
before holidays would have interrupted contact between
people at schools and workplaces. Immunity generated dur-
ing the unusually large ﬁrst wave in the United States prob-
ably helped to limit the attack rates there during the second
wave. It is interesting that, in Europe and Asia, the majority
of inﬂuenza-related deaths occurred during the second
wave, while in North America the ﬁrst wave had the greater
mortality impact (48). We could not assess whether these
differences were reﬂected in changes in R0 between the 2
waves, since no suitable second-wave data were identiﬁed
for any American setting.
It is unlikely that the apparent increase in R0 between
waves was due to increased ascertainment during the second
wave (e.g., due to greater awareness of the virus), since
increases were observed even using serologic data from
samples submitted for other tests (2–4), for which ascertain-
ment is unlikely to vary between waves.
Our estimates of R0 are lower than many previous esti-
mates for the 1918 (10–16) and 1957 (12, 13, 17) pan-
demics, which is consistent with the correspondingly
smaller size of the 1968 pandemic. Our estimates of R0
for the ﬁrst wave of the H3N2 pandemic are also lower than
the 2 previous estimates for this wave (20, 21), which were
derived from models describing the global spread of inﬂu-
enza; Rvachev and Longini (20) and Longini et al. (51)
estimated R0 as 3.10, and Cooper et al. (21) estimated it
as between 0.5–1.5 and 2.5–3.5. Both sets of investigators
assumed that approximately 60% of the global population
was initially susceptible. We generally assumed that the
proportion susceptible was higher than this, based on the
available serologic data for each setting. Using the ﬁgure
of 60% for the data sets for which this was possible would
produce estimates of R0 for the ﬁrst wave of 1.76–3.35,
Table 3. Changes in the Basic Reproduction Number (R0) Between
Waves of the H3N2 Inﬂuenza Pandemic of 1968
Setting
First Wave Second Wave
R0 95% CI R0 95% CI
United Kingdom
(RCGP data)
1.26 1.24, 1.28 2.08 2.04, 2.12
United Kingdom
(survey of PHLS
samples)
2.00 1.57, 2.43 2.78 2.33, 3.23
United Kingdom
(laboratory reports
to PHLS)
1.44 1.42, 1.46 2.66 2.43, 2.90
England and Wales
a 1.26 1.24, 1.28 2.42 2.05, 2.82
Scotland 1.37 1.32, 1.42 2.16 2.04, 2.28
Lambeth, London,
United Kingdom
1.54 1.13, 1.95 2.77 1.93, 3.61
Sa ˜o Paulo, Brazil 2.06 1.77, 2.35 3.58 1.95, 5.21
Sydney, New South
Wales, Australia
1.31 1.04, 1.58 2.04 1.59, 2.49
Epping, New South
Wales, Australia
1.16 0.92, 1.41 2.12 1.78, 2.46
Royal Air Force
bases, England
1.13 0.89, 1.37 1.86 1.60, 2.12
Abbreviations: CI, conﬁdence interval; PHLS, Public Health Labo-
ratory Service; RCGP, Royal College of General Practitioners.
a First-wave estimate was based on clinical data; second-wave
estimate was based on laboratory reports.
476 Jackson et al.
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Rn were close to the upper bounds (45); consequently, if our
assumptions about the proportion susceptible are correct,
our estimates of R0 are probably not underestimates. In fact,
if the generation time of H3N2 pandemic inﬂuenza was
shorter than the 4 days we assumed (shorter generation
times have been assumed for other inﬂuenza viruses (52)
and estimated for H1N1 inﬂuenza (53)), the R0 would be
even lower than estimated here.
R0 forthesecondpandemicwave has beenestimatedas2.2
(12)andRnas1.85(12), 1.8 (13), or1.56(19). Otheranalyses
ofthesecondwaveimpliedanR0of3.5inEnglandandWales
and an R0 of 3.5 or 4.9 in Greater London (11, 18; Ben
Cooper, Health Protection Agency, United Kingdom, unpub-
lished observations). Most of our R0 estimates for the second
wave lie within the range of these previous estimates.
It is possible that H1N1 inﬂuenza will cause a second
wave of infection, and it is difﬁcult to predict whether the
virus will continue to behave as it has done thus far. Our
results indicate that pandemic inﬂuenza viruses may be-
come more transmissible between successive waves, and
this possibility shouldbe considered in mitigation strategies.
Editor’s note: Reference 54 is cited in the legend of Web
Figure 3 (http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/).
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